Newly Insured Californians Would Fall by More than 1 Million Under the Affordable Care Act Without the Requirement to Purchase Insurance by Christina M. Kinane et al.
Newly Insured Californians Would Fall by More than 1 Million  
under the Affordable Care Act without  
the Requirement to Purchase Insurance  
 
Gerald F. Kominski, Dylan H. Roby, Ken Jacobs, Greg Watson,  
Dave Graham-Squire, Christina M. Kinane, Daphna Gans, and Jack Needleman  
 
 
 
This policy note was funded by a grant from The California Endowment. 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY: The Affordable Care Act (ACA) requirement that almost all Americans 
purchase some type of health insurance coverage has been controversial. This policy note   
examines the potential implications of eliminating the minimum coverage requirement 
(MCR), or "individual mandate." Based on analyses using the California Simulation of  
Insurance Markets (CalSIM) model, the authors find that the ACA will reduce California’s 
eligible uninsured population from 4.63 to 2.72 million by 2019; a reduction of             
1.91 million or 41% of the eligible uninsured. In contrast, without the MCR, the ACA will 
reduce the state’s eligible uninsured population from 4.63 to 3.76 million; a reduction of 
only 870,000 or 19% of the  eligible uninsured. Comparing the number of newly insured 
with and without the MCR shows that the number of newly insured will be 1.04 million 
lower in 2019 without the MCR. In addition, eliminating the MCR is likely to accelerate 
premium growth due to adverse selection. If this occurs, the ACA will reduce the state’s 
eligible uninsured from 4.63 to 4.02 million by 2019; a reduction of only 610,000 or 13% 
of the eligible uninsured. The number of newly  insured will be 1.30 million lower in 2019 
without the MCR and with higher premiums due to adverse selection. Eliminating the 
MCR from the ACA would therefore substantially lower  the number of newly insured 
Californians by 2019 and undermine the goal of the law to substantially increase health 
insurance coverage for the uninsured. 
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Minimum Coverage Requirement Is Necessary to Ensure Affordable Coverage 
Starting in 2014, the ACA will fundamentally change the individual insurance markets throughout the 
country. Insurers will be required to issue policies to anyone seeking health coverage (known as    
guaranteed issue) and will no longer be allowed to set premiums or deny coverage based on health 
status or previous spending. Instead, insurers will only be allowed to vary premiums based on a limited 
set of personal characteristics (age, smoking status, geographic location and family size), known as 
modified community rating. To avoid adverse selection, where individuals avoid buying coverage until 
they need it, the ACA requires virtually all individuals to either purchase or enroll in insurance       
coverage through Medicaid, Medicare, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, their employers, or 
the individual insurance market. Those who fail to comply with this minimum coverage requirement 
will be subject to a penalty administered through the personal income tax system that will be phased in 
starting in 2014 and will equal 2.5% of modified adjusted gross income or $695 per person (up to a 
maximum of $2,085 per household) in 2016.  
As a result of these changes due to the ACA, we estimate that an additional 1.91 million non-elderly 
Californians will have insurance coverage in 2019 (Exhibit 1). An estimated 3.02 million Californians 
would have coverage through the newly created California Health Benefit Exchange (CHBE) or the 
individual market outside of the Exchange.  
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Without the minimum coverage requirement, the ACA would still allow Californians to purchase  
guaranteed issue, modified community rated coverage anytime regardless of health status, gender,    
pre-existing conditions, or other risks. However, there would be no penalty for people who remain  
uninsured and wait until they have high medical costs to obtain insurance. This would result in lower 
costs for those who forego insurance coverage, and a larger proportion of Californians being            
uninsured. Furthermore, the individual insurance market would be subject to adverse selection, where 
sicker, more expensive individuals and those who want to use more health care services would be 
more likely to buy insurance.  
Removing the requirement to obtain insurance from our CalSIM model, we find that the number of 
newly insured would be 1.04 million (or 54%) lower in 2019 than under the ACA with the coverage 
requirement (Exhibit 1).  
Adverse Selection Could Threaten Affordable Coverage 
The last column in Exhibit 1 shows the combined effect of removing the minimum coverage require-
ment and higher premium growth that is likely to occur due to adverse selection. Chandra et al. (2011) 
found that individuals who purchased health insurance in Massachusetts prior to the implementation of 
that state’s minimum coverage requirement had 45% higher health care expenditures than those who 
did not purchase health insurance coverage until after the requirement was implemented.1  Because the 
subsidies available in Massachusetts are more generous than those available under the ACA, adverse 
selection in California and the rest of the nation could be greater if the requirement is eliminated.  
To model the impact of adverse selection, we assumed a 15.4% per year growth in premiums from 
2014 to 2019 (or an additional 7.9% per year over our baseline assumption for premium growth). This 
premium increase is based on the current average rate of growth in premiums in the pre-ACA          
individual insurance market.2  
When this higher growth rate in premiums is combined with the impact of eliminating the minimum 
coverage requirement, we estimate that only 610,000 Californians will be newly insured in 2019, a 
number that is 68% lower relative to the ACA with the minimum coverage requirement, and which 
represents only 13% of the eligible uninsured (Exhibit 1). Under these assumptions, the size of the  
Exchange and individual market falls to 2.02 million due to the higher cost of coverage. In addition, 
the population that purchases insurance in the individual market and the Exchange is both older and 
more likely to have one or more chronic illnesses relative to the population in these markets under the 
ACA.  
Our findings of a decline of 54-68% in the newly insured if the minimum coverage requirement was 
eliminated are similar to those of other researchers who have modeled the impact at the national level. 
The Congressional Budget Office projects that 50% fewer individuals would be covered under the 
ACA without this requirement, while Gruber (2011) estimates that 75% fewer would be covered.3  
Sheils and Haught (2011) find a smaller impact, with a 25% reduction in the number of individuals 
covered.4  
Conclusion 
Eliminating the minimum coverage requirement (or individual mandate) under the ACA would      
substantially lower the number of newly insured Californians by 2019 and would undermine the goal 
of the law to substantially increase health insurance coverage for the nation’s uninsured population. 
The CalSIM Model 
The California Simulation of Insurance Markets (CalSIM) model is designed to estimate the impact of various 
elements of the ACA on employer decisions to offer insurance coverage and individual decisions to obtain   
coverage in California. The CalSIM model uses four data sources: the 2004–2008 Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey (MEPS) Household Component (MEPS-HC) and the Person Round Plan (MEPS-PRPL) public use data 
files, the 2009 California Health Interview Survey (CHIS), California Employment Development Department 
(EDD) 2007 wage distribution, insurance offer, and firm size data, and the 2010 California Employer Health 
Benefits Survey (EHBS). CHIS, EDD and CEHBS provide weights and wage distributions that adjust the     
nationally-representative MEPS data to build a California-specific model. Once re-weighted, the MEPS-HC 
respondents are then assumed to represent the population of California. However, MEPS-HC does not include 
data on immigration status, and until 2007 did not report whether an individual was born in the United States. 
We therefore constructed a regression model using CHIS 2009 confidential data to predict the immigration 
status of MEPS-HC respondents based on a variety of socioeconomic, demographic and family characteristics. 
By accounting for immigration status within the individual dataset construction process, the CalSIM model is 
able to adjust Medi-Cal and Exchange eligible populations based on undocumented immigrant and recent legal 
permanent residence status before determining firm and individual coverage  decisions, rather than imposing an 
ex post adjustment. This approach enables a more     accurate picture of the Medi-Cal and Exchange eligible and 
enrolled populations in California. However, it is limited by the sensitivity of the logistic regression modeling 
approach and predicted immigration status propensity scores. 
Individuals are then identified as workers and non-workers (i.e., the unemployed and the respective dependents/
spouses of workers). Workers are assigned employer wage distribution characteristics from EDD 2007 data 
based on firm size and insurance offer status from their MEPS record. The firms are then  statistically matched 
to the Employer Sponsored Insurance (ESI) data from the 2010 CEHBS, which contains additional information 
on the actuarial value of the health plans offered. The matched dataset is used to create synthetic firms          
consisting of workers and their families, who then choose to participate in different aspects of the ACA, such as 
taking up coverage or dropping coverage. These decisions, once made by the firm and linked to each employee 
and their families, allow for individual probabilities to be assigned for insurance choices depending on family 
characteristics such as household income, health status, cost, availability of other coverage options, and         
immigration status.   
The California Simulation of Insurance Markets (CalSIM) model was created by the UC Berkeley Center for 
Labor Research and Education and the UCLA Center for Health Policy Research with funding from               
The California Endowment. For further information, please visit http://www.healthpolicy.ucla.edu/pubs/files/
calsim_methods.pdf. 
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